Smahi v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., No. 5:23-cv-06645-PCP (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2026), full opinion (PDF)
A plaintiff wiped his computer the night before a forensic examination he had agreed to with his former employer. He also erased his phone and deleted two accounts in response to the employer's request to image his devices and email accounts. On September 8 a district judge in the Northern District of California found that he acted with intent to deprive under Rule 37(e)(2). An adverse inference instruction followed from that finding. The employer had asked for terminating sanctions. Whether the sanction went that far turned on the prejudice the employer could show. The court said the employer had not demonstrated any measurable prejudice to its defense, since the employer likely had the work email itself. On the trade secret counterclaims the court found prejudice, but less than terminating sanctions require.
What happened
Rachid Smahi sued his former employer, STMicroelectronics (ST), for employment discrimination and retaliation. In discovery he produced documents that, ST said, showed he had kept confidential company material. ST added trade secret counterclaims. It also sent Smahi a letter asking for forensic imaging of his devices and email accounts to see how much he had retained.
Smahi eventually turned over the devices and accounts. Some of them had been significantly altered by then, the court found. He had erased and restored his iPhone, deleted an iCloud account, and deleted a Gmail account he had never disclosed. On the night before the agreed forensic examination he wiped his iMac. On ST's motion for sanctions, the court held an evidentiary hearing on whether Smahi had the intent that terminating or adverse inference sanctions require.
The court's analysis
Intent, the court explained, is proved circumstantially, because no one can know what was in the spoliating party's mind. The court looked to the timing of the destruction and the degree of volition behind the act. The court found his testimony about his reasons not credible. His explanations, in the court's description, were shifting and improbable.
He said he read ST's letter as an instruction to destroy the documents and then certify that he had done so. His second explanation was a suspicious sign-in warning for his Google Drive. A scam email, he said, had compromised his passwords. He also revealed at the hearing that he had wiped the iMac at least two more times before the examination. The court found that Smahi deliberately wiped his devices and deleted his accounts in response to notice that they would be examined. Based on that pattern and his lack of credibility, it found intent to deprive the defendants of the ESI.
Having found intent, the court concluded that an adverse inference sanction was appropriate. How far the sanction should go depended on prejudice. ST argued that the spoliation impaired both its defense and its counterclaims. Because Smahi had been its employee, ST likely held its own copies of his work email, the court reasoned.
The court found that the wipes did prejudice ST's trade secret counterclaims. The deleted iCloud account, it noted, held a backup of the wiped iPhone. Smahi testified that he had copied the disputed emails from Outlook to his computer and then sent them all to his lawyer. The court accepted ST's point that any record of what was downloaded may now be gone. That prejudice fell short of what terminating sanctions require, the court concluded. Jurors will be told they may assume the destroyed evidence would have been harmful to Smahi. Given that instruction, the court declined to add monetary sanctions. The order also resolved the summary judgment motions on the employment claims.
Why it matters
Proving intent is not the end of a Rule 37(e)(2) motion. ST proved intent and still received less than it asked for. The remedy was measured against the prejudice ST could demonstrate, not against the plaintiff's conduct. A movant seeking terminating sanctions therefore needs a prejudice record as much as an intent record. That means identifying what the destroyed ESI would have shown and why nothing else in the case supplies it. ST could not do that for its defense, since it likely held its own copies of the plaintiff's work email. Its counterclaims were different, because the wiped iPhone backup and any record of what he downloaded may be gone for good.
For a party facing a forensic examination, the lesson is about timing. Every wipe and deletion came after ST's letter asking to image the devices. The court treated that sequence as evidence of intent. An account that changed each time it was given supplied the rest of the intent finding. A party who cleans a device after learning it will be examined should expect the timing to speak for itself. Any explanation offered afterward is likely to be tested at a live hearing rather than accepted on the papers.
The full opinion is available as a PDF.
